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First Impressions 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of issues of first impression 
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between 
March 1, 2010 and September 17, 2010.  This collection is organized by 
circuit. 
Each summary presents an issue of first impression, a brief 
analysis, and the court’s conclusion.  It is intended to give only the 
briefest synopsis of the first impression issue, not a comprehensive 
analysis.  This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will 
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point.  If a circuit 
does not appear on the list, it means that the editors did not identify any 
cases from the circuit for the specified time period that presented an issue 
of first impression. 
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FIRST CIRCUIT 
Gastronomical Workers Union Local 610 v. Dorado Beach Hotel 
Corp., 617 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “an employer [can] shield itself from 
[Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)] liability under  
[§] 302 simply by performing its obligations under a collective 
bargaining agreement[]” or whether, despite the contract, the employer 
must make additional contributions when a pension plan fails to meet 
minimum funding requirements. Id. at 58, 62. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “pension contribution obligations 
are contractual in nature.” Id. at 62. It further said, however, that “this 
tenet does not exist in a vacuum.” Id. The court stated that “statutory 
mandates operate in tandem with contractually imposed duties[,]” and 
“[w]hen a plan fails to meet the statutorily imposed minimum funding 
requirement for a given plan year, the employer must satisfy the 
requirement by making further payments, regardless of the terms of the 
[collective bargaining agreement].” Id. The court reasoned that statutory 
obligations exist independently of private contracts, and allowing a 
collective bargaining agreement to supersede statutory mandates would 
allow parties to “elude ERISA’s commands by the simple expedient of 
sharp bargaining . . . [thus] frustrat[ing] one of ERISA’s primary goals: 
to ensure that covered pension plans provide employees promised 
retirement benefits.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “an employer cannot shield 
itself from ERISA liability under [§] 302 simply by performing its 
obligations under a collective bargaining agreement.” Id. 
Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng. Inc., 603 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 
2010) 
QUESTION: Whether federal courts have jurisdiction over 
compulsory or permissive counterclaims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
Id. at 76. 
ANALYSIS: With respect to compulsory counterclaims, the court 
reasoned that Congress did not withdraw supplemental jurisdiction to 
hear the counterclaim so that it could be reserved for exclusive 
jurisdiction under a specific agency. Id. at 84. Next, in addressing 
permissive counterclaims, the court noted that § 1367 explicitly included 
permissive counterclaims and reasoned that all case law (prior to the 
1990 enactment of the statute) that prevented permissive counterclaims 
should be disregarded. Id. at 86–87. 
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CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held “28 U.S.C. § 1367 . . . gives 
federal courts supplemental jurisdiction over both compulsory and at 
least some permissive counterclaims.” Id. at 76. 
Riva v. Ficco, 615 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “mental illness [can] equitably toll the  
one-year statute of limitations for the filing of a state prisoner’s habeas 
petition contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 (AEDPA) 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)[.]” Id. at 37 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the AEDPA applies a one-year 
statute of limitations to an application for a writ of habeas corpus and 
stated further that the AEDPA “expressly provides that the limitations 
period is tolled by a properly filed application for State post-conviction 
of other collateral review.” Id. at 38–39. The court then referenced a 
recent Supreme Court decision determining “that the AEDPA limitations 
period is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances.” Id. at 
39. The court further noted that in order to establish a basis for equitable 
tolling, a petitioner must “demonstrate (1) that he has been pursuing his 
rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 
his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The court then reasoned that mental illness was one of those 
extraordinary circumstances, based on the court’s own precedent 
involving mental illness and other federal statutes of limitation. Id. at 40. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held “that mental illness can 
constitute an extraordinary circumstance, which may prevent a habeas 
petitioner from understanding and acting upon his legal rights and 
thereby equitably toll the AEDPA limitations period.” Id. 
San Juan Cable LLC v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 612 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 
2010) 
QUESTION: Whether a cable operator has “an implied private right 
of action to enforce [§] 541(b)(1) of the Cable Communications Policy 
Act of 1984 (Cable Act), 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1), against a rival who has 
violated that provision[.]” Id. at 27–28. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis with the baseline rule that a 
court should read a federal statute as written. Id. at 30. The court 
reasoned that since a private right of action to enforce § 541(b)(1) is 
absent from the Cable Act, Congress must have intended not to provide 
for one. Id. In support of this inference, the court emphasized that the 
private rights of action that Congress did expressly extend to cable 
operators exists to preserve and protect an individual cable operator’s 
ability to provide its own cable service. Id. at 31. The court reasoned that 
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implying a private right of action for a cable operator against a rival 
would be “incongruous . . . with the inward-looking private rights of 
action expressly granted in the Cable Act.” Id. Finally, the court reasoned 
that a private right of action for cable operators against their rivals would 
contradict the very premise of the Cable Act, which is to “ensure that 
would-be cable operators are not unfairly deprived of an opportunity to 
enter the marketplace . . . .” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “the Cable Act does not 
carry with it an implied private right of action in favor of an incumbent 
cable operator against a would-be rival.” Id. at 32. 
 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
Argueta v. Holder, 617 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether, when prior conviction cannot be used for 
evaluating moral character for purposes of Nicaraguan Adjustment and 
Central American Relief Act (NACARA) eligibility, it necessarily 
follows that those same prior convictions may not be used by the 
immigration judge when weighing discretionary factors. Id. at 113. 
ANALYSIS: The court first stated that “[t]here is no statutory or 
regulatory provision that temporally restricts the discretionary factors 
[under consideration] in deciding whether to grant or deny cancellation 
of removal.” Id. The court then pointed out that “under [Board of 
Immigration Appeals] precedent, the [immigration judge] regularly 
balances many positive and adverse factors in deciding how to exercise 
its discretion[,]” and that “[a]mong the factors deemed adverse to an 
alien [is] . . . the existence of a criminal record.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The court concluded that “prior criminal acts are not 
excluded from consideration because of their vintage[]” and that “prior 
convictions [are] considered as part of the overall balancing test . . . .” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that it was within the 
discretion of the immigration judge to consider prior convictions, despite 
the fact that prior convictions cannot be used for evaluating moral 
character for purposes of NACARA eligibility. Id. 
Dinler v. City of New York (In re City of New York), 607 F.3d 923 (2d 
Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether the court “should issue a writ of mandamus to 
overturn an order of the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York . . . granting a motion to compel the production of 
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certain sensitive intelligence reports prepared by undercover officers of 
the New York City Police Department.” Id. at 928. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “a writ of mandamus is the 
only ‘adequate means’ for the City to seek review of the District Court’s 
order and thereby prevent the irreparable harm that the City—and thus 
the public—would suffer from the disclosure of the Field Reports.” Id. at 
929. The court then noted that “because [it had] never before addressed 
the circumstances in which the law enforcement privilege must yield to a 
party’s need for discovery, this petition presents ‘novel and significant 
questions of law whose resolution will aid in the administration of 
justice.’” Id. Ultimately, the court reasoned that the City “has a ‘clear 
and indisputable’ right to the writ because the District Court indisputably 
‘abused its discretion’ in making three distinct errors[,]” including: (1) 
“failing to apply a ‘strong presumption against lifting the privilege’”; (2) 
“failing to require that plaintiffs show a ‘compelling need’ for the Field 
Reports”; and (3) making “a clearly erroneous assessment of the 
evidence when it found that plaintiffs’ need for the Field Reports 
outweighed the public’s interest in their secrecy.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the City had a “clear and 
indisputable” right to the writ of mandamus because the writ is (1) the 
only means of relief available to the City at this time; (2) is a matter 
novel and significant since it requires the court to clarify many aspects of 
the standard for reviewing claims of law enforcement privilege; and (3) 
there were clear errors committed by the District Court. Id. 
Katel Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 607 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether the International Telecommunications 
Regulations (ITRs), promulgated by the International 
Telecommunications Union, afford a private right of action. Id. at 67. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that the ITRs have treaty 
status, and treaties presumptively do not create private rights of action 
unless there is language to the contrary. Id. The court found that no 
wording in the ITRs creates this private right of action. Id. The court then 
addressed the argument that because the treaty binds the United States, a 
private right of action exists ipso facto. Id. The court decided that this 
assertion would hold true for sovereign entities but not for private 
corporations because they are not members of the International 
Telecommunications Union. Id. at 67–68. The court finally noted that 
“[w]hether a Member State has rights under the treaty, or is bound by it, 
says nothing about whether a private party in that Member State has a 
private right of action.” Id. at 68. 
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CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the ITRs did not create a 
private cause of action. Id. 
L-3 Commc’ns Corp. v. OSI Sys., Inc., 607 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether a party that is granted costs for an appeal 
where judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, modified, or vacated 
is in the same position with regard to costs as a prevailing party on an 
appeal where judgment is entirely affirmed, dismissed, or reversed. Id. at 
28. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by discussing the latter group of 
situations, citing the provisions of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 39(a)(1)–(3), which govern when it is “generally apparent which 
party should bear the costs . . . .” Id. The court then interpreted Rule 
39(a)(4), which acknowledges the first category of outcomes, in which it 
may be more difficult to determine what party should bear the costs on 
appeal. Id. The court read the provision as “requiring the appellate court 
to make a determination about which party, if any, should bear costs 
before costs may be taxed[,]” but the appellate court need not delineate 
exactly which costs that party will bear. Id. at 29. The court noted that 
the fact that a court awards costs to a party under Rule 39(a)(4) would 
not reduce the party’s ability to recover costs taxed in the district court, 
or in any way limit the party to only a partial recovery of its costs. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “[o]nce a party is 
designated by the appellate court without limitation as the party entitled 
to costs under subsection (a)(4), it is entitled to seek costs in the same 
manner as is a prevailing party under subsections (a)(1), (2), and  
(3) . . . .” Id. 
United States v. Menendez, 600 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual § 2S1.1(a)(1), a district court may consider the underlying 
offense’s base offense level when calculating the base offense level for 
the related offense of money laundering without reducing the ultimate 
offense level because of mitigating conduct. Id. at 266. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that the sentencing statute’s express 
language “permits consideration of relevant conduct to determine only 
the defendant’s accountability for the underlying offense.” Id. at 268. 
The court reasoned that “relevant conduct . . . [therefore] is not 
considered in any way to affect the underlying offense level.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the court rejected the 
notion of “mitigating relevant conduct[,]” determining that the 
“[g]uidelines require the court to take into account uncharged conduct 
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that is ‘[r]elevant [c]onduct . . .’ in order to increase the defendant’s 
offense level.” Id. The court further opined that adopting such an 
interpretation of relevant conduct “undermines the express purpose of  
[§] 2S1.1(a) to punish direct money launderers one to four levels greater 
than the Chapter Two offense level for the underlying offense.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the court reasoned, the third-
party money laundering provision of the sentencing statute permits the 
court to consider mitigating conduct (e.g. the value of the laundered 
funds) in determining the offense level. Id. at 269. The court found that 
reducing the base offense level by applying that standard would 
“erroneously conflate the direct money laundering provision under  
§ 2S1.1(a)(1) with the third-party money laundering provision under  
§ 2S1.1(a)(2).” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the sentencing guidelines 
allow the court to “calculat[e] the base offense level for . . . conspiracy to 
launder money, by considering the [base offense level] involved in [a] 
conviction for . . . conspiracy to distribute heroin . . . without according 
any reduction in the offense level based on the lesser amount of funds 
actually laundered in the criminal scheme.” Id. 
Nen Di Wu v. Holder, 617 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, or under what circumstances, a case 
should be dismissed pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine 
before the merits of the case are fully before the court.” Id. at 100. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “[a]t a minimum, a court must find 
that a party either is currently a fugitive from justice or was a fugitive 
from justice and that a nexus exists between the party’s former fugitive 
status and the appeal.” Id. The court noted that once it determines a party 
is a fugitive, the court must look to “the reasons for the doctrine and the 
equities of the case.” Id. The court determined that when the record does 
not reflect “the extent to which [the defendant] is evading the law[]” or 
“how [the defendant’s] fugitive status would prejudice the Government’s 
case[,]” it could not use the merits of the case to “inform [its]  
discretion . . . .” Id. at 101–03. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “in immigration cases, 
motions to dismiss pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine are 
correctly addressed only after briefing—and, where appropriate, 
argument—on the merits of the appeal.” Id. at 103. 
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Robinson Knife Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 600 F.3d 121 
(2d Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether taxpayers subject to 26 U.S.C. § 263A are 
allowed to deduct their intellectual property royalties? Id. at 129. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the taxpayer presented three 
arguments as to why royalty payments need not be capitalized under  
§ 263A: “(1) that the royalty payments are deductible as ‘marketing, 
selling, advertising, [or] distribution costs,’ . . . ; (2) that royalty 
payments which are not ‘incurred in securing the contractual right to use 
a trademark, corporate plan, manufacturing procedure, special recipe, or 
other similar right associated with property produced,’ . . . are always 
deductible; and (3) that the royalty payments were not ‘properly 
allocable to property produced.’” Id. at 128–29. First, the court held that 
royalty payments cannot be deducted as marketing, selling, advertising, 
or distribution costs. Id. at 130. The court stated that “[i]f all trademark 
royalties were ‘marketing, selling, advertising, [or] distribution costs,’ 
then they would be deductible regardless of the terms of the contracts 
under which they were paid[]”; “[a]s a result, a lump-sum minimum 
royalty payment . . . would be immediately deductible.” Id. The court 
reasoned that the rationale behind § 263A is “to make sure that 
trademark royalties are not deducted during a taxable year” preceding the 
year in which the corresponding trademarked items are sold; holding 
royalty payments immediately deductible would therefore produce “a 
mismatching of expenses and the related income and an unwarranted 
deferral of taxes.” Id. Second, the court held that “royalty payments 
which are not incurred in securing the contractual right to use a 
trademark, corporate plan, manufacturing procedure, special recipe, or 
other similar right associated with property produced, are not 
deductible[]” because “it would be contrary to the purpose of § 263A to 
permit taxpayers to manufacture inventory and deduct royalties 
immediately, even if that inventory were not sold or otherwise disposed 
of until a later taxable year.” Id. Finally, the court agreed that the 
royalties were not “properly allocable to property produced.” Id. at 130–
31. The court reasoned that it would be contrary to the purpose of § 
263A to permit taxpayers to “manufacture inventory and deduct royalties 
immediately, even if that inventory were not sold or otherwise disposed 
of until a later taxable year.” Id. at 130. The court noted “it is the costs, 
and not the contracts pursuant to which those costs are paid, that must be 
a but-for cause of the taxpayers production activities in order for the 
costs to be properly allocable to those activities and subject to the 
capitalization requirement.” Id. at 131–32. The court further observed the 
record was clear that the royalties were sales-based, were calculated as a 
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percentage of the net sales, and were incurred only upon the sale of the 
items. Id. at 134. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held “that taxpayers subject to 26 
U.S.C. § 263A may [immediately] deduct royalty payments that are  
(1) calculated as a percentage of sales revenue from certain inventory, 
and (2) incurred only upon sale of such inventory.” Id. at 134–35. 
 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
Elassad v. Independence Air, Inc., 604 F.3d 804 (3d Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the [Federal Aviation Act (the Aviation 
Act)], the [Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA)], and their implementing 
regulations preempt state tort law with respect to accidents that occur 
when a passenger is disembarking a plane.” Id. at 810. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “it has traditionally been the 
province of state law to govern disputes in cases where a plaintiff alleges 
that he fell as a result of the defendant’s negligence.” Id. at 810–11. 
Therefore, the court determined that for there to be field preemption in 
the area, the court must “find that federal law ‘leav[es] no room for state 
regulation’ and that Congress had a ‘clear and manifest’ intent to 
supersede state law.” Id. at 811. The court examined both acts, finding 
that there was no evidence that Congress intended to impose a duty in the 
area of “assistance provided to passengers during their disembarkation” 
in the Aviation Act. Id. at 814. The court further noted that the “ACAA 
regulations are intended to protect passengers from discrimination by air 
carriers; they are not intended to dictate a standard of care in a 
negligence action.” Id. at 815. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that state negligence law 
should govern in actions against air carriers for injuries sustained by 
passengers during disembarkment because the Aviation Act and the 
ACAA do not preempt state law. Id. at 816. 
United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether appellate courts should employ a plenary or 
plain error standard of review when evaluating a post-hoc claim that one 
criminal charge has tainted the jury’s consideration of another. Id. at 178. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that issues of taint and insufficiency 
of the evidence stem from theories of the case; therefore, it looked to its 
standards of review under sufficiency of the evidence for guidance. Id. 
The court explained that it exercises plenary review on appeal when a 
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sufficiency challenge arises at trial, but it exercises plain error standard 
of review when such a challenge arises post-hoc. Id. Proceeding by 
analogy, the court reasoned that it should adopt the same distinction 
between the standards of review it exercises in evaluating a challenge 
based on taint. Id. at 179. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit adopted a plain error standard of 
review when a evaluating a post-hoc challenge based on taint. Id. 
Patel v. AG of the United States, 599 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “the [Immigration and Nationality Act’s 
(INA)] confidentiality provisions [are] inapplicable to applications for 
[Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE)] Act Family Unity  
benefits . . . .” Id. at 297. 
ANALYSIS: The court first applied a “basic tenet of statutory 
construction” and analyzed the language of the LIFE Act’s Section 
1104(c)(5) and INA’s § 245a(c)(5) in accordance with its ordinary 
meaning. Id. at 298 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court 
determined that “the plain language of [the LIFE Act] makes clear that 
the confidentiality provisions apply . . . only insofar as the filing is an 
application for adjustment of residency status.” Id. As a result, the court 
was unable “to conclude that Congress intended to extend the protection 
of INA § 254A(c)(5) to any filing other than an application by an alien 
for adjustment of residency status.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that the INA’s confidentiality 
provisions apply only to applications to adjust the residency status of 
aliens. Id. 
Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 613 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether variations among state antitrust statutes are 
so far-reaching that those differences overshadow [factual] 
commonalities when a class of indirect purchasers seeks [class] 
certification on a nationwide basis.” Id. at 146. 
ANALYSIS: To determine whether a class of indirect purchasers 
may possess a “common question of law” sufficient to qualify for the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3) certification, the court 
first surveyed the pertinent state antitrust statutes. Id. at 146–48. The 
court observed that some states afford standing to indirect purchasers to 
seek antitrust recovery, while other states provide standing for indirect 
purchasers only when the state joins the suit as parens patriae. Id. at 147. 
A third group of states denies standing to indirect purchasers outright. Id. 
The court concluded that this disparity made nationwide class 
certification both improper under Rule 23(b)(3) and violative of the 
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“Rules Enabling Act, which prohibits a court from interpreting 
procedural rules to create new substantive rights.” Id. at 149. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that state antitrust statutes are 
so disparate that nationwide class certification of indirect purchasers is 
improper despite factual commonalities. Id. at 149–50. 
 
FOURTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Alston, 611 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether, under the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), a court may properly enhance a 
defendant’s sentence based upon a prosecutor’s proffer of facts to which 
defendant had never admitted. Id. at 220. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that Supreme Court precedent in 
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), and Taylor v. United 
States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) “adher[ed] to the demanding requirement 
that any sentence under the ACCA rest on a showing that a prior 
conviction necessarily involved (and a prior plea necessarily admitted) 
facts equating to a predicate offense[.]” Id. at 225 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The court reasoned that these limitations serve two vital 
interests: first, by limiting the items available to determine the nature of 
prior convictions, ‘“collateral trials’ are avoided[]”; and second, limiting 
sentencing courts to a specified set of records mitigates concerns over 
potential Sixth Amendment violations. Id. The court noted that while the 
Sixth Amendment does not guarantee “a right to have a jury find the fact 
of a prior conviction,” Shepard prevents sentencing courts from 
determining whether prior convictions may serve as the ACCA predicate 
offenses unless the facts are inherent in the conviction or confirmed by 
the defendant. Id. at 225–26. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that the ACCA, 18 U.S.C.  
§ 924(e), requires that the defendant admit elements of the qualifying 
offense before the court may properly enhance the defendant’s sentence. 
Id. at 227. 
United States v. Pettiford, 606 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “a petitioner is entitled to [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 
relief after successfully attacking some of his predicate sentences if those 
vacated convictions are not necessary for the armed career criminal 
designation.” Id. at 162. 
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ANALYSIS: The court began by looking at the language of 28 
U.S.C. § 2255(b) that provided when the court should grant habeas relief. 
Id. at 163. Under § 2255(b), a petitioner must show that his sentence was 
unlawful because “judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or . . . the 
sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to 
collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of 
the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment 
vulnerable to collateral attack.” Id. The court noted that a district court 
should grant the prisoner a remedy only after the prisoner has met this 
threshold inquiry. Id. Even when there has been vacatur of convictions, 
the prisoner may not have met the threshold inquiry. Id. at 164. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that “[v]acatur alone does not 
entitle a petitioner to habeas relief.” Id. 
 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Bautista-Montelongo, 618 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether the operator of a boat carrying a controlled 
substance is a “captain” or “pilot” as defined by 18 U.S.C. Appx.  
§ 2D1.1(b)(2)(C) where the operator possessed no “special skill” as a 
captain-pilot. Id. at 466. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the statute provides a two level 
increase for a defendant who imports or exports a controlled substance 
when “the defendant acted as a pilot, copilot, captain, navigator, flight 
officer, or any other operation officer aboard any craft or vessel carrying 
a controlled substance.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court 
stated that the three other circuits who had ruled on the issue had given 
the terms “captain” and “pilot” their everyday meaning. Id. at 466–67. 
The court adopted the holdings of its sister courts; it refused to “apply 
rigid requirements of professionalism to the captain-pilot enhancement, 
opting instead for a common sense approach.” Id. at 467. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that a special skill was not 
necessary for the captain-pilot enhancement. Id. 
Lavie v. Ran, 607 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether the court should recognize a foreign 
bankruptcy proceeding that is pending abroad “as a foreign main or 
nonmain proceeding,” so as to afford the receiver a variety of protections 
of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1019. 
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ANALYSIS: The court discussed the proper classification of a 
foreign main proceeding. Id. at 1022. First, the court established that the 
country in which the proceeding is pending has to be the debtor’s center 
of main interest (COMI). Id. The court noted that, although the 
Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define the term, it will presume the 
COMI to be “the debtor’s registered office, or habitual residence in the 
case of an individual” unless there is evidence to the contrary. Id. at 
1022. The court considered additional factors, similar to those involved 
in domicile determinations. Id. at 1023–24. Next, the court discussed 
what constitutes a foreign nonmain proceeding and posited that the sole 
requirement is an establishment in the foreign country. Id. at 1026. The 
court found that a debtor has an establishment if he has a place of 
operations in the foreign country and carried on nontransitory economic 
activity in the foreign country at the time that the creditor filed the 
petition for recognition. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that the bankruptcy proceeding 
was not a foreign main or nonmain proceeding, and so the bankruptcy 
receiver was not entitled to various protections. Id. at 1028. 
Mission Primary Care Clinic, PLLC v. Dir., 370 Fed. App’x 536 (5th 
Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “payments made to a member of an LLC . . . 
constitute items sufficiently similar to salary or wages to allow use of [26 
U.S.C. [§] 6331(e) to levy on them.” Id. at 539. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted the absence of a definition of 
“salary or wages” within the continuing levy provision, and therefore 
turned to Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R. § 301.6331-1(b)(1). Id. The 
court noted that this regulation includes compensation in the form of 
fees, bonuses, commissions, and “similar items” within the term “salary 
and wages” for the purposes of attaching a levy. Id. The court therefore 
declined to limit 26 U.S.C. § 6331(e) to payments branded as wages or 
salary and instead “focus[ed] on the ‘critical characteristics’ of the 
payments rather than on their label.” Id. at 540 (citation omitted). The 
court went on to utilize “[its] own precedent interpreting provisions of 
the Tax Code for guidance in determining which characteristics of 
‘salary or wages’ are relevant.” Id. The court identified four factors 
relevant to characterizing payments: “(1) whether the services performed 
were more like those performed by an employee or a shareholder;  
(2) whether there was corporate authorization for the payment of salaries; 
(3) whether book entries showed periodic payments or lump sum 
payments; and (4) whether the payments bear a relationship to the 
earnings of the corporation.” Id. In light of the four factors, the court 
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found the facts that the payments were periodic and “proportionate to 
[the member’s] own work product, and not to an ownership share” 
indicated that the payment was “more akin to wages than to a pure 
distribution of profits.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that all of the “characteristics 
support the conclusion that the payments to [an LLC member] were 
‘salary or wages’ within the meaning of [26 U.S.C. § 6331(e)].” Id. 
United States v. Rains, 615 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a conviction under [18 U.S.C.] § 924(c) 
counts as a felony drug offense for purposes of applying the 
enhancement under [21 U.S.C.] § 841(b)(1)(B).” Id. at 596. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted the 4th Circuit had previously held 
“that § 924(c) could be the basis for an enhancement, at least when the 
record made clear that the conviction involved a drug trafficking crime 
rather than a crime of violence.” Id. at 597. Furthermore, the court 
recognized its own precedent “that it is permissible to apply the 
enhancement even when the statute of conviction covers non-drug-
related conduct so long as the record makes clear the actual violation 
involved drugs.” Id. at 598. Additionally, the court noted that existing 
case law foreclosed the application of the rule of lenity. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held “that § 924(c) can be the basis 
for an enhancement under § 841(b)(1) when the record makes clear that 
the conviction involved a drug trafficking crime rather than a crime of 
violence.” Id. 
 
SIXTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Coccia, 598 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether requiring a defendant to provide a DNA 
sample under 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d) (DNA Act) has an overriding 
punitive effect and violates the Constitution’s prohibition on Ex Post 
Facto laws. Id. at 296, 298. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that blood tests “generally are 
considered minimally intrusive.” Id. at 299. The court noted that the 
DNA Act did “not have a retribution component because it does not label 
the offender as more culpable than before, and is not geared toward 
making [the individual] understand and regret the severity of his crimes.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court further reasoned that the 
“penalty in the DNA Act for non-compliance is punished as a separate 
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offense, diminishing potential ex post facto concerns because the purpose 
of the Clause is to protect against increased punishment for prior, not 
separate, offenses.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that the DNA Act was “not so 
punitive in effect as to override its regulatory purpose,” and thus its 
application to the defendant did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. 
at 298. 
United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “an officer [may] conduct questioning during 
a traffic stop that (1) is unrelated to the underlying traffic violation, (2) is 
unsupported by independent reasonable suspicion, and (3) prolongs the 
stop by even a small amount?” Id. at 486. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[t]he ultimate touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment . . . is reasonableness” and that Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has “consistently eschewed bright-line rules . . . .” Id. at 
492. The court also observed that every other circuit to confront the issue 
had refused to impose a categorical “no-prolongation” rule. Id. The court 
reasoned that such a rule would provide little protection against police 
abuse because an officer might ask “unrelated questions to his heart’s 
content, provided he does so during the supposedly dead time while he or 
another officer is completing a task related to the traffic violation.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit declined to impose “a categorical 
ban on suspicionless unrelated questioning that may minimally prolong a 
traffic stop.” Id. 
Hamdi v. Napolitano, 620 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether petitioner’s claim was barred by 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1252(g), which precludes “federal courts from exercising subject-
matter jurisdiction over any cause or claim . . . on behalf of any alien 
arising from [any action by the Department of Homeland Security] . . . .” 
Id. at 620. 
ANALYSIS: The court observed that the proper interpretation of “on 
behalf of” was “a matter of first impression in [that] circuit (and 
apparently in all circuits).” Id. at 621. The court indicated it would 
“examine the statute for its plain meaning[,]” and that it would look to 
the “relevant legislative history” if the language was unclear. Id. The 
court noted that judicial precedents favored “narrow construction[s] of 
jurisdictional limits[,]” and that courts should not broadly interpret 
“jurisdiction-stripping provisions in the absence of explicit congressional 
intent.” Id. at 622. Finally, the court reasoned that while petitioner’s 
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claim could benefit his alien mother, petitioner was litigating his own 
constitutional rights. Id. at 623. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “a complaint brought by a 
U.S. citizen child who asserts his or her own distinct constitutional rights 
and separate injury does not fall fairly within [the] jurisdictional bar [of] 
§ 1252(g).” Id. 
Smith v. Solis, No. 08-4058, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15457 (6th Cir. 
July 26, 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether a court has “jurisdiction to review an 
untimely request for a hearing” when the case arises under the Surface 
Transportation and Assistance Act (Transportation Act). Id. at *5. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 5th Circuit had addressed this 
issue and found that the Transportation Act’s filing time restrictions are 
not jurisdictional. Id. at *5. The court also noted that both the respondent 
and an intervenor conceded that granting tolling to the petitioner would 
not prejudice them. Id. at *6. The court stated that “[i]n deciding whether 
equitable tolling is appropriate in a given case,” it must look to five, non-
comprehensive factors: “(1) lack of actual notice of filing requirement; 
(2) lack of constructive knowledge of filing requirement; (3) diligence in 
pursuing one’s rights; (4) absence of prejudice to the defendant; and (5) a 
plaintiff’s reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the notice 
requirement.” Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court held 
that “a complainant should not be punished for missing a filing deadline 
when he is affirmatively misled in a manner that causes that delay.” Id. at 
*9. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that the court has jurisdiction to 
hear the untimely request for a hearing for a case arising under the 
Transportation Act. Id. at *6. 
Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272 (6th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “a plaintiff asserting unfair discriminatory 
practices or undue preference under §§ 202(a) and (b) of the [Packers 
and Stockyards Act (PSA)] must allege an adverse effect on competition 
in order to state a claim.” Id. at 276. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that antitrust suits “require a party to 
allege an adverse effect on competition in order to sustain a cause of 
action,” and that the PSA is primarily an antitrust statute. Id. at 277. The 
court further noted that all of the circuits that have addressed this issue 
have determined that “the purpose of the [PSA] is to protect competition 
and, therefore, only those practices that will likely affect competition 
adversely violate the Act.” Id. Thus, the court decided that an adverse 
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effect on competition must be alleged. Id. The court declined to create a 
circuit split on this issue and reasoned that “the rationale employed by 
our sister circuits is well-reasoned and grounded on sound principles of 
statutory construction.” Id. at 279. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “in order to succeed on a 
claim under [§§ 202(a) and (b) of the PSA], a plaintiff must show an 
adverse effect on competition.” Id. 
Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., 615 
F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “local educational agencies . . . have statutory 
standing under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) to challenge a state agency’s 
compliance with certain ‘procedural safeguards’ set forth in 20 U.S.C.  
§ 1415(b)[,]” both of which are portions of the Individuals with 
Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA). Id. at 624. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that it first needed to “determine 
whether the IDEA creates an express right for a local educational agency 
to maintain a civil action against a state educational agency[,]” and if not, 
it then needed to “determine whether the IDEA creates an implied right 
of action.” Id. at 627. The court reasoned that the “text of the IDEA does 
not contain language that expressly authorizes a local educational agency 
to bring an action against a state educational agency . . . .” Id. The court 
stated that congressional intent is dispositive for finding an implied right 
of action. Id. at 628. Because “Congress expressly provided a private 
right to sue in favor of any party aggrieved by a decision under 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(b)” but “did not expressly provide a private right of action in 
favor of a[n] . . . educational agency[,]” the court reasoned that Congress 
did not intend to provide educational agencies with statutory standing. Id. 
at 629. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “the IDEA does not 
provide School Districts with an express or implied right to compel State 
Defendants’ compliance with § 1415(b)’s procedural safeguards, absent 
an underlying claim that directly involves a disabled child’s individual 
educational program.” Id. at 624. 
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SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Barnes, 602 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether a trial court “may disregard a post-trial factual 
stipulation between the defendant and the government regarding the 
amount of drugs for sentencing purposes.” Id. at 795. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “a district court has the authority 
to reject a factual stipulation in a plea agreement.” Id. The court observed 
that the sentencing guidelines, while granting parties the authority to 
provide stipulated facts to the district court, were silent on post-trial 
stipulations. Id. at 796. The court reasoned that unless it read that silence 
“to mean that post-trial stipulations of fact are also not authorized under 
the sentencing guidelines, [it could not] read the absence of an explicit 
grant of authority to disregard a post-trial stipulation as controlling in 
this situation either.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that “the absence of explicit 
instruction on how to deal with post-trial stipulations of fact to mean that 
[it] should treat post-trial stipulations as [it] would any other stipulation 
of fact, and grant the fact-finder the same authority to accept or reject the 
stipulation.” Id. 
United States v. Bell, 598 F.3d 366 (7th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION ONE: Whether the statute of limitations began to run 
when the defendant’s child-support arrearage exceeded $10,000 or 
whether 18 U.S.C. § 228 is a continuing offense and is not completed 
until the offense expires. Id. at 368. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that to determine whether an 
offense is “continuing,” the courts examine “whether the language of a 
criminal statute compels that conclusion or whether the nature of the 
crime is such that Congress must have intended it to be treated as a 
continuing one.” Id. at 369. The court noted that the “language of the 
statute describes the offense continuing over a period of time either 
directly in terms of an accumulation of years of delinquency or indirectly 
in terms of an accumulation of money such that Congress [ ] imagined 
the criminalized conduct to last continuously . . . .” Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The court further noted that “state courts routinely hold 
that state statutes criminalizing the willful failure to meet child-support 
obligations create continuing offenses.” Id. Moreover, the court reasoned 
that penalties increase if the “deadbeat parent has failed to pay child 
support for more than two years, suggesting that it would be nonsensical 
if the punishment increased for the first two years (or when the arrearage 
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exceeded $10,000) but then fell to zero if the defendant successfully 
evaded the law for five years . . . .” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 228 is a 
continuing offense and the statute of limitations did not toll until the 
offense expires. Id. at 368. 
 
QUESTION TWO: Whether a court must give a jury instruction “that 
the government [must] prove that a defendant . . . understand[s] that he is 
violating a federal statute to be guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 228.” Id. at 369–
70. 
ANALYSIS: The court analyzed the language of the statute, and 
specifically noted the “word ‘willful’ is a word of many meanings, and 
its definition is often influenced by its context.” Id. at 370. The court 
noted that the legislative history does not suggest that the “defendant 
must know of the specific statute that he is violating—only that he knows 
of the legal duty (the duty to support the child) that he is violating.” Id. 
The court further reasoned that the violation of a child-support order is 
“not apparently innocent conduct, and it is fitting that the defendant need 
not know of the specific federal law he is violating.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that the government need not 
prove that the defendant knew he was violating a federal statute. Id. at 
371. 
United States v. LaFaive, 618 F.3d 613 (7th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1028A’s “prohibition on using 
the identification of ‘another person . . .’” criminalizes only the use of a 
living person’s identity, or also the use of a deceased person’s identity. 
Id. at 615, 617. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that it was critical to determine the 
meaning of “another person” in § 1028A(a)(1). Id. at 616. The court 
reasoned that, since the statute did not define “person,” the court would 
assume that Congress “intended it to have its ordinary meaning.” Id. The 
court observed that “the common usage of the word person includes both 
living and deceased individuals.” Id. The court further noted that “there 
is nothing in § 1028A(a)(1) that would naturally limit the definition of 
person to just the living.” Id. at 616–17.  
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that the § 1028A prohibition on 
using the identification of “another person” criminalizes both the use of a 
living person’s identity and a deceased person’s identity. Id. at 617. 
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Ojeda v. Goldberg, 599 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “a fraudulently induced forbearance 
constitutes an extension or renewal of credit for purposes of [11 U.S.C.] 
§ 523.” Id. at 718. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked to the definitions of “extension” and 
“renewal” to determine whether the fraudulently induced forbearance of 
which the plaintiff creditor complained was within the ambit of 11 
U.S.C. § 523. Id. The court noted that Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“extension” as “‘[t]he continuation of the same contract for a specified 
period,’ or ‘[a] period of additional time to take an action, make a 
decision, accept an offer, or complete a task.’” Id. at 718–19. The court 
cited the definition of “renewal” as “‘[t]he re-creation of a legal 
relationship or the replacement of an old contract with a new contract, as 
opposed to the mere extension of a previous relationship or contract.” Id. 
The court found that a fraudulently induced forbearance was squarely 
within the definition of an extension or a renewal under the statute. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that “a fraudulently induced 
forbearance does constitute an extension or renewal.” Id. at 718. 
Shlahtichman v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 615 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether a computer-generated purchase confirmation 
email that includes the expiration date of the purchaser’s credit card is a 
violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA). Id. 
at 796. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that FACTA covers only printed 
receipts and reasoned that the ordinary meaning of the word “print” 
means “recording it on paper.” Id. at 799. The court then determined that 
the modifier “electronically” refers to “those receipts that are printed by 
machine, as opposed to those which are handwritten or created by taking 
an impression of the card using an imprinter.” Id. The court further 
reasoned that “[FACTA] . . . applies to receipts that are printed and 
provided to the cardholder at the point of sale or transaction.” Id. at 800 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that “the language and context 
[of the provision] make plain that Congress was regulating only those 
receipts physically printed by the vendor at the point of sale or 
transaction; to apply the statute to receipts that are emailed to the 
consumer would broaden the statute’s reach beyond the words that 
Congress actually used.” Id. at 802. 
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United States v. Thompson, 599 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “holding a supervised-release revocation 
hearing by videoconference violates [Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure] Rule 32.1(b)(2).” Id. at 596. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that a defendant is entitled to “an 
opportunity to appear, present evidence, and question any adverse 
witness . . . and an opportunity to make a statement and present any 
information in mitigation.” Id. at 598 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The court noted that Rule 32.1(b)(2) provides that “before revoking a 
defendant’s supervised release, the court must give the defendant ‘an 
opportunity to appear’ for purposes of presenting evidence, questioning 
witnesses, arguing in mitigation, and making a statement to the court.” 
Id. at 599. The court then examined the traditional definitions of the 
word “appear,” which “suggested that the ‘appearance’ required by this 
rule occurs only if the defendant comes into the physical—not virtual—
presence of the judge.” Id. Moreover, the court found that the 
“defendant’s appearance in court is the means by which he effectuates 
the other rights conferred by the rule[,]” and “without [the] personal 
interaction between the judge and the defendant—which the 
videoconferencing cannot fully replicate—the force of the other rights 
guaranteed by Rule 32.1(b)(2) is diminished.” Id. at 599–600. The court 
further determined that construing Rule 32.1(b)(2) to mandate the 
defendant’s personal appearance before a judicial officer “comports with 
the traditional legal understanding of a person’s ‘appearance’ before a 
court when his liberty is at stake in the proceeding . . . .” Id. at 600. 
Finally, the court reasoned that “the use of [videoconferencing] is the 
exception to the rule, not the default rule itself[]” because other rules of 
procedure permit such technology “only pursuant to a specifically 
enumerated exception and with the defendant’s consent . . . .” Id. at 600–
01.  
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that “the ‘opportunity to 
appear’ in Rule 32.1(b)(2) . . . exclude[s] an ‘appearance’ by 
videoconference.” Id. at 601. 
Young v. Verizon’s Bell Atl. Cash Balance Plan, 615 F.3d 808 (7th 
Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION ONE: At what time does a claim for equitable 
reformation under Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)  
§ 502(a) accrue for the purposes of the statute of limitations. Id. at 817. 
ANALYSIS: The court adopted the “general federal common law 
rule . . . that an ERISA claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should 
know of conduct that interferes with the plaintiff’s ERISA rights.” Id. 
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Applying this rule to the facts at hand, the court found that while the 
defendant “discovered the drafting mistake in 1997, it did not then know 
that this mistake would give rise to a controversy requiring it to raise an 
equitable reformation claim.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that “[n]one of the parties’ 
claims accrued before 2005 when [plaintiff] brought her federal court 
ERISA action, so these claims are timely under the applicable [statute of 
limitations period].” Id. 
 
QUESTION TWO: “[W]hether § 502(a)(3) authorizes equitable 
reformation of an ERISA plan due to a scrivener’s error . . . .” Id. at 818. 
ANALYSIS: The court first examined similar case law “addressing 
the related problem of ambiguous plan language[,] [which] suggests that 
[equitable] relief may be appropriate.” Id. The court then looked to 
holdings from the 3rd, 4th, 8th, and 9th Circuits, which “either concluded 
that ERISA authorizes such [equitable] relief or does not foreclose the 
possibility.” Id. at 819. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held “that ERISA § 502(a)(3) 
authorizes equitable reformation of a plan that is shown, by clear and 
convincing evidence, to contain a scrivener’s error that does not reflect 
participants’ reasonable expectations of benefits,” as it would “thwart 
this goal [of protecting employees] to enforce erroneous plan terms 
contrary to those expectations, even if doing so would increase 
employees’ benefits.” Id. The court underscored that the “appropriate 
equitable relief authorized by § 502(a)(3) allows a court to reform an 
ERISA plan to avoid such an unfair result.” Id. 
 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
EEOC v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 598 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether an employment agency violates Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b), by failing to refer 
an individual for employment when the individual’s bona fide religious 
belief conflicts with an employment requirement. Id. at 1030. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the plain language of Title VII 
“states that an employment agency violates Title VII if it ‘fail[s] or 
refuse[s] to refer for employment . . . any individual because of his . . . 
religion . . . .’” Id. The court then stated that a plaintiff must show “that 
the agency discriminated against her based on her [religion] in relation to 
referrals[]” to succeed on a Title VII claim against an employment 
agency.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court reasoned that 
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there must be an actual, referable position for an employment agency’s 
refusal to make a referral to constitute an adverse employment action. Id. 
The court noted that once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
discrimination case, it applies a burden-shifting scheme that “require[s] 
the employer to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
adverse employment action.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). The court then analyzed whether the employment agency’s 
proffered nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action was pretextual. 
Id. at 1031–32. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that when an employment 
agency refuses to make a referral, but offers a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its action, and this reason is not mere 
pretext, the agency has not violated Title VII. Id. at 1033. 
Jobe v. Medical Life Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 478 (8th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether, in a health and welfare plan that is subject to 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), “a summary 
plan description prevails over the formal policy where the summary 
grants to a plan administrator rights not present in the formal policy, yet 
also indicates that the policy prevails if the two documents conflict . . . .” 
Id. at 484. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that although it had previously held 
that “a summary plan description prevails over conflicting language in 
the policy,” it is required to give the language of the two documents a 
“common and ordinary meaning.” Id. at 485. The court determined it 
“must construe the documents as a reasonable person in the position of 
the [plan] participant, not the actual participant, would have understood 
the words.” Id.  The court noted that “summary plan description 
expressly states that no rights accrue by reason of the summary.” Id. 
Therefore, the court found “the average plan participant would read that 
provision and conclude that the policy prevails if it conflicts with the 
summary, and that the summary could not, standing alone, grant [the 
administrator] the discretion it claims to have.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that the summary plan 
description does not “vest the administrator with discretion where the 
policy provides a mechanism for amendment and disclaims the power of 
the summary plan description to alter the plan.” Id. at 484. 
Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether an internet service provider (ISP) is “immune 
from suit under the [Communications Decency Act (CDA)].” Id. at 790. 
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ANALYSIS: The court first looked to the language of the CDA, 
which states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider . . . .” Id. The court 
reasoned that this plain language “bar[s] plaintiffs from holding ISPs 
legally responsible for information that third parties created and 
developed.” Id. at 791. The court determined that Congress only intended 
ISPs to bear responsibility for “speech that is properly attributable to 
them[]” and not for “information originating with a third-party user of 
the service.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that “the CDA provides  
ISPs . . . with federal immunity against state tort defamation actions that 
would make service providers liable for information originating with 
third-party users of the service . . . .” Id. at 792. 
United States v. Hull, 606 F.3d 524 (8th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3), “a 
criminal forfeiture statute,” includes the full acreage of the property 
subject to forfeiture or “only a portion of the acreage should be 
forfeited.” Id. at 527–28. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “[o]ur cases have concluded, 
with respect to other criminal forfeiture statutes . . . that the natural 
source for defining property subject to forfeiture is the instrument 
creating the defendant’s interest in the property.” Id. at 528 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The court reasoned that “[g]iven this circuit 
precedent, and the absence of any material difference in language 
between these statutes and § 2253(a)(3) on the meaning of property, 
[there is] no basis to adopt a different approach.” Id. The court further 
noted that “[o]nce it is established that the property subject to forfeiture 
consists of the entire acreage, nothing in the statute allows the court to 
order forfeiture of less than this property.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held “that the statute . . . authorizes 
forfeiture of [the entire acreage of a defendant]’s real property.” Id. at 
529. 
United States v. Malloy, 614 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether a state conviction of extortion involving 
threats only against property qualifies as a crime of violence under U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a). Id. at 857. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that although “extortion is 
specifically listed as a crime of violence in [the federal code,]” it could 
not rely solely on this label. Id. The court then looked to an analogous 
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case in which the 1st Circuit noted that “nothing in the Guidelines, which 
specifically list extortion as a crime of violence, states or implies that 
extortion must involve threats to harm the person of another.” Id. at 858. 
The court considered the 1st Circuit’s reasoning that “restricting 
‘extortion’ . . . to include only threats of physical harm would render the 
guideline redundant, as the Guidelines make ‘any crime that has as an 
element the threatened use of physical force against the person of another 
a crime of violence.’” Id. The 8th Circuit agreed with the 1st Circuit that 
there is “no reason to read [the Guidelines] so narrowly as to exclude 
extortion that threatened only property.” Id. at 859. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that conviction under a state 
extortion statute involving threats only against property is a crime of 
violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. 
Public Water Supply Dist. No. 3 v. City of Lebanon, 605 F.3d 511 (8th 
Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether the language “‘[t]he service provided or made 
available’ under [7 U.S.C.] § 1926(b) refers solely to the service for 
which a qualifying federal loan was obtained and which provides the 
collateral for the loan . . . or to all services that a rural district  
provides . . . .” Id. at 519. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that this issue is one of statutory 
interpretation and looked to the plain meaning of the statute’s language. 
Id. at 519. The court then noted it does not “construe statutory phrases in 
isolation; [it] read[s] statutes as a whole,” and it found that the “isolated 
use of the term ‘service,’ without explanation, provides little insight into 
the interpretive question . . .” presented by the case. Id. at 520. The court 
then looked to other sections within the same statute where the singular, 
rather than the plural, form of “service” was used, finding that “Congress 
used only the singular term ‘service.’” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that the language “‘the service 
provided or made available’ to be limited to the financed service . . . .” 
Id. at 521. 
Sierra Club v. Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether the Clean Air Act (CAA) “prohibit[s] only 
construction or modification of a facility without a [Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (PSD)] permit and [‘best available control 
technologies’ (BACT)], or [whether it] impose[s] ongoing operational 
requirements.” Id. at 1014. 
ANALYSIS: The court first analyzed the language of the CAA, 
which states that “‘[n]o major emitting facility . . . may be constructed’ 
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without meeting the PSD requirements.” Id. Additionally, the 8th Circuit 
noted that the provisions of the CAA establishing operational conditions 
for facilities “do so by employing plain and explicit language.” Id. at 
1015. Likewise, the court found that the citizen suit provision of the 
CAA is “limited to construction or modification, for it authorizes suit 
‘against any person who proposes to construct or constructs’ a facility 
without a permit.” Id. Thus, the court reasoned that “neither the statutory 
provision that creates the legal duty at issue here nor the provision for 
private enforcement gives any indication that the CAA imposes ongoing 
operational conditions under the PSD program.” Id. The court finally 
considered and rejected arguments that certain regulations required 
ongoing PSD and BACT compliance. Id. at 1016–17. Ultimately, the 
court disagreed because “[t]he context of [such regulations] show[] that 
the command to apply BACT is not a freestanding requirement[]”; 
instead, “it is tied specifically to the construction process.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that the CAA and its related 
regulations apply only to construction and modification of a facility 
without a PSD permit or BACT, and do not apply to operations. Id. at 
1018. 
United States v. Young, 613 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “a defendant is entitled to an abandonment 
defense [to the crime of attempt] once an attempt has been completed.” 
Id. at 744. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that every circuit court to consider 
this issue held or implied that a defendant cannot abandon a completed 
attempt. Id. The court cited its own precedent, where it determined “the 
abandonment defense: (1) can apply to uncompleted attempt crimes, . . . 
and (2) has been rejected as a defense to completed crimes other than 
attempt . . . .” Id. at 746. The court therefore reasoned it “logically 
flow[ed]” that “when a defendant has completed the crime of attempt[]” 
by “ha[ving] the requisite intent and ha[ving] taken a substantial step 
towards the completion of the crime, he cannot successfully abandon the 
attempt because the crime itself has already been completed.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held “the defense of abandonment is 
not warranted once a defendant completes the crime of attempt.” Id. 
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NINTH CIRCUIT 
Almaraz v. Holder, 608 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether adoption of an international trade 
agreement amounts to changed country conditions that resurrect . . .” a 
motion filed by a party in an untimely manner. Id. at 639. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that a defendant who requests that 
a late motion be excused or files a motion to reopen a petition for 
successive asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) must demonstrate 
“changed country conditions.” Id. at 640. To that end, the court 
recognized that “international trade agreements affect the lives of the 
citizens of signatory countries in numerous ways” and that such 
agreements “could potentially qualify as a material change in country 
conditions sufficient to grant a motion to reopen.” Id. at 641. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit recognized that international trade 
agreements may qualify as “a material change in country conditions 
sufficient to grant a motion to reopen” a petition for successive asylum 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D), but only where the petitioner establishes 
that the international trade agreement led to changed circumstances. Id. 
at 641–42. 
Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a municipal ban on tattoo parlors violates 
the First Amendment.” Id. at 1055. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that for a municipality to justify a 
ban on tattoo parlors, it must show that the ban “is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end 
. . .” as a “time, place, or manner restriction.” Id. at 1063. The court 
noted that three criteria are requisite in determining the constitutionality 
of the ban, namely, whether the ban: “(1) is justified without reference to 
the content of the regulated speech; (2) is narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest; and (3) leave[s] open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.” Id. at 1064 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The court held that a municipality cannot ban 
a tattoo parlor if the municipality does not provide sufficient evidence 
that its health and safety interests would benefit more from an all out ban 
rather than from placing certain restrictions on the operation of a tattoo 
parlor. Id. at 1064–68. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “tattooing is purely 
expressive activity fully protected by the First Amendment, and that a 
total ban on such activity is not a ‘reasonable time, place, or manner’ 
restriction.” Id. at 1055. 
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United States v. Batson, 608 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2010)  
QUESTION: Whether “federal courts may order restitution as a 
condition of supervised release for offenses set forth in Title 26 of the 
United States Code (the Internal Revenue Code).” Id. at 631. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that under 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(2), 
courts have broad enough discretion to order restitution as a condition of 
probation. Id. at 631–32. The court then reasoned that 18 U.S.C.  
§ 3583(d) allows courts to apply that discretion to supervised release. Id. 
at 632. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2), however, the court 
must limit restitution to offenses of conviction without elements of a 
“scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that federal courts have the 
authority to order restitution for offenses in Title 26 of the United States 
Code. Id. at 631. 
United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant’s indictment under 18 U.S.C.  
§§ 1591(a) and 2423(a) is multiplicitous, or “charges a single offense in 
more than one count[,]” in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Double 
Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 1194. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s 
prohibition on double jeopardy protects against being punished twice for 
a single criminal offense.” Id. The court explained that “if the same act 
constitutes a violation of two different statutes, the test to determine 
whether punishment for both offenses may be imposed is ‘whether each 
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’” Id. The 
court further reasoned that “elements of the offenses are determinative, 
even if there is a substantial overlap in their proof.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The court therefore compared 18 U.S.C.  
§ 1591(a) with 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), and it noted that “§ 1591(a) plainly 
requires proof that defendant knew that the victim was under the age of 
eighteen years at the time of the crime [while] the government need not 
prove such knowledge for purposes of § 2423(a).” Id. at 1195. The court 
further observed that “§2423(a) requires proof that the defendant 
intended that the victim engage in prostitution, [but] such intent need not 
be proven for § 1591(a).” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the elements of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1591(a) and 2423(a) each require proof of a fact that the other does 
not, and the multiplicity challenge therefore failed. Id. 
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Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Hearthside Residential 
Corp., 613 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether ‘owner and operator’ status under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), is determined at the time that 
cleanup costs are incurred or instead at the time that a recovery lawsuit 
seeking reimbursement is filed.” Id. at 911. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that determining ownership at the 
time of cleanup comports with CERCLA’s statute of limitations, which 
begins either “(1) at the completion of a ‘removal’ action, or (2) at the 
initiation of an on-site ‘remedial’ action.” Id. at 914. The court noted that 
statutes of limitations seek to protect defendants, and therefore “it is 
reasonable to assume that Congress meant the statute of limitations to 
run against (and protect) the owner of the property at the time cleanup 
occurs.” Id. Further, such a reading of “ownership” is in accord with two 
of CERCLA’s overarching purposes: (1) “encourag[ing] responsible 
parties to remediate hazardous facilities without delay[,]” and  
(2) “encourag[ing] early settlement between potentially responsible 
parties and environmental regulators.” Id. at 915. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “current ownership for 
purposes of liability under [CERCLA] . . . is measured from the time the 
recovery action accrues.” Id. at 916. 
Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a plan participant’s retirement cuts off a 
putative alternate payee’s right to obtain an enforceable [Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order (QDRO)] with regard to the surviving spouse 
benefits of a [Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity (QJSA)].” Id. at 
1055. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “surviving spouse benefits 
under a QJSA vest at the time of the participant’s retirement . . .” and a 
court may not modify the QJSA to reflect a new beneficiary after the 
date of retirement. Id. at 1055–56. The court also determined that the 
statutory scheme of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) “establishes the importance of the annuity start date” by 
establishing restrictions to modifying or opting out of QJSA benefits. Id. 
at 1057. The court also noted that the legislative history of the statute 
indicated that only recent enactments have specifically provided for a 
non-working spouse in consideration of the event where a participant 
predeceases a spouse. Id. at 1058. Finally, the court supported the vesting 
rule above because one of the principal goals of ERISA is “ensuring that 
plans be uniform in their interpretation and simple in their application” 
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and that allowing the spousal recipient to change after the vesting date 
will “make it difficult for trustees to administer plans . . . .” Id at 1059. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “the surviving spouse 
benefits irrevocably vest in the current spouse when the plan participant 
retires.” Id. 
Carver v. Holder, 606 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “an action for enforcement of an [Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)] decision may be 
brought in the district court.” Id. at 695. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “an employee who prevails on 
his [EEOC administrative] claim has two avenues into federal court”; the 
employee may bring an “enforcement action” or a “civil action” against 
the agency. Id. at 696. The court then noted that “[i]n an enforcement 
action, a prevailing employee may not challenge the . . . decision [of the 
EEOC’s appellate arm] regarding either discrimination or what it found 
to be appropriate remedies.” Id. The court stated that other circuits have 
held the “civil action must be de novo, putting at issue both the [EEOC 
appellate arm]’s liability determination . . . and its finding with regard to 
remedies.” Id. The court reasoned “that the EEOC’s response to [an 
employee]’s petition for enforcement is as much a part of the 
administrative disposition as is the remedial order itself” and held that 
“to the extent [an employee] characterizes his action as a suit for 
enforcement . . . his suit is limited to the enforcement of the EEOC’s 
administrative disposition as a whole.” Id. at 697. The court determined 
that an employee “must either accept the administrative disposition in its 
entirety or bring a de novo action in the district court.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that an employee may not bring 
an enforcement action of an EEOC decision in a district court. Id. 
United States v. Coronado, 603 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether the crime of “discharging a firearm with gross 
negligence” is a crime of violence under the residual clause of U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a). Id. at 708. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the standard in Begay v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 137 (2008), is appropriate in this case to determine if the 
crime fits within the residual clause of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual § 4B1.2. Id. at 710. Applying the standard, the court first noted 
that the dispositive issue is “whether a person convicted of negligent 
discharge of a firearm . . . necessarily engaged in conduct that was 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive” and that “[a]ll three criteria must be 
satisfied.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court reasoned that 
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for an act to be purposeful, it requires a heightened mens rea or an 
intentional act, not necessarily satisfied by gross negligence. Id. at 710–
11. Finally, the court noted that certain other crimes requiring a mens rea 
of negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness did not constitute 
purposeful crimes. Id. at 711–12. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a conviction of 
“discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner[] is not a ‘crime of 
violence’” because it fails to satisfy the purposeful requirement of the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Begay. Id. at 712. 
Fernandes v. Holder, 619 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether an immigration judge’s (IJ) jurisdiction over a 
case is limited when the case is on remand from the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA). Id. at 1074. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[a]n articulated purpose for the 
remand, without any express limit on scope, is not sufficient to limit the 
remand such that it forecloses consideration of other new claims or 
motions that the IJ deems appropriate or that are presented in accordance 
with relevant regulations.” Id. The court reasoned that “[t]he BIA is free 
to impose a different rule, but in the absence of such a rule [the court] 
will construe a BIA remand to an IJ in the manner just described.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that an IJ’s jurisdiction over a 
case is limited only “when the BIA expressly retains jurisdiction and 
qualifies or limits the scope of the remand to a specific purpose.” Id. 
United States v. Forrester, 616 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant has the right to “collaterally 
attack the substance . . .” of a controlled drug scheduling order when 
“Congress has not explicitly foreclosed such review.” Id. at 936. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that there are five schedules of 
controlled substances and the defendant was not allowed to give a 
defense that attacked the categorization of the drug he was convicted of 
possessing. Id. at 935. The court noted that prior cases allowing collateral 
attacks were “limited to temporary orders” because permanent 
scheduling orders are thoroughly examined by attorney generals and 
different rules govern their direct attack. Id. The court reasoned that 
certain schedules are not subject to direct attack because “the [Drug 
Enforcement Agency] itself is not a party in the case[,]” and would have 
“no opportunity to defend its scheduling order.” Id. at 936 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Finally, the court noted that “to allow all 
criminal defendants to collaterally attack a permanent scheduling order 
based on their view that a particular drug has been  
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mis-scheduled would potentially place a continuing, onerous burden on 
district courts to constantly re-litigate the same issue.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “substantive collateral 
attacks on permanent scheduling orders are impermissible in criminal 
cases where defendants’ sentences will be determined by those 
scheduling orders.” Id. at 937. 
Kazarian v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 596 F.3d 1115 (9th 
Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) 
properly interpreted the “statutory and regulatory requirements for the 
‘extraordinary ability’ visa” according to 8 C.F.R. § 204(h)(3). Id. at 
1120. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “scant” caselaw revealed that 
“regulations regarding this preference classification are extremely 
restrictive.” Id. First, the court determined that the regulation’s 
requirement, which calls for the visa applicant to show authorship of 
scholarly articles in the field of expertise giving him grounds for 
application, does not mandate that the applicant show the “research 
community’s reaction to these articles.” Id. at 1121. Second, the court 
determined that 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(iv) requires only evidence of 
judging academic work and it is not necessary to show specific facts such 
as whether the applicant is otherwise affiliated with the university for 
which he or she otherwise reviews such works. Id. at 1121–22. Third, the 
court determined that the AAO properly applied the standard required 
under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(v) when it held that applicant’s 
contributions were not major and thus did not meet the requirements of 
the regulation. Id. at 1122. Finally, the court agreed with the AAO’s 
determination that the publishing of textbooks, lecturing at a college 
level, and presenting at conferences do not constitute “artistic exhibitions 
or showcases” required by 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(vii). Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3) requires 
the applicant to provide three types of evidence when applying for 
extraordinary ability visa. Id. 
United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “a transferee court has jurisdiction to revoke 
supervised release for violations committed before transfer.” Id. at 1126. 
ANALYSIS: The court first referred to 18 U.S.C. § 3605, providing 
that “[a] court to which jurisdiction is transferred under this section is 
authorized to exercise all powers over the probationer or releasee that are 
permitted by this subchapter . . . which includes the power to revoke a 
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term of supervised release . . . if the court . . . finds by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised 
release[.]” Id. at 1126–27 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court 
noted that the text and structure of the statute authorizes a transferee 
court to revoke supervised release for violations committed before a 
transfer. Id. at 1126. Further, the court observed that other circuits 
considering the issue have decided that such courts have the necessary 
jurisdiction. Id. at 1127. Further, to hold that transferee courts do not 
have the jurisdiction requisite to revoke supervised release for violations 
committed before a transfer would lead to two adverse effects: first, the 
court “would create a ‘twilight zone’ of immunity for violations” that 
occurred but were not discovered before the defendant’s transfer; second, 
such a finding would apply equally to transferee courts’ authority “to 
terminate or reduce the conditions of supervised release.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “a transferee court has 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3605 to revoke a term of supervised 
release for violations committed before the transfer of jurisdiction.” Id. at 
1128. 
United States v. Rosas, 615 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a sentence enhancement pursuant to [18 
U.S.C.] § 3147 may be applied to a defendant when the only offense 
committed while on release was a violation of [18 U.S.C.] § 3146, failure 
to appear.” Id. at 1064. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the plain language of § 3147 
“clearly and unambiguously mandates that the courts impose additional 
consecutive sentences on persons convicted of crimes they commit while 
released on bond.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court 
found “nothing exceptional . . . vague or ambiguous[]” about the statute, 
and it noted other courts’ holdings that § 3147 mandates a sentence 
enhancement for “the offense of failure to appear in violation of § 3146.” 
Id. The court then considered and rejected the possibility that a sentence 
enhancement violates “the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy  
Clause . . . by enhancing the sentence for the underlying conviction.” Id. 
at 1065. The court reasoned that the “Double Jeopardy Clause does no 
more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater 
punishment than the legislature intended.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Likewise, the court concluded, denial of “a reduction for 
Acceptance of Responsibility on the basis of . . . failure to appear [does] 
not constitute double counting because [Acceptance of Responsibility] 
constitutes a sentencing benefit which a defendant may [or may not] be 
entitled to receive.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “a defendant convicted of 
the offense of failure to appear may be subject to a sentence 
enhancement (on his underlying conviction) under § 3147, for 
committing an offense while on release.” Id. at 1064. 
Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure authorizes “a district court to strike a claim for damages on the 
ground that such damages are precluded as a matter of law.” Id. at 971. 
ANALYSIS: Examining the plain meaning of Rule 12(f), the court 
first considered “whether [a claim for damages precluded as a matter of 
law is]: (1) an insufficient defense; (2) redundant; (3) immaterial; (4) 
impertinent; or (5) scandalous.” Id. at 973–74. Finding none of these 
attributes present, the court then advised against the use of Rule 12(f) as 
a mechanism “to have certain portions of [the] complaint dismissed or to 
obtain summary judgment . . . as to those portions of the suit—actions 
better suited for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a Rule 56 motion, not a Rule 
12(f) motion.” Id. at 974. The court suggested that reading Rule 12(f) “in 
a manner that allowed litigants to use it as a means to dismiss some or all 
of a pleading . . . would be creating redundancies within the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, because Rule 12(b)(6) . . . already serves such 
a purpose.” Id. Moreover, since “Rule 12(f) motions are reviewed for 
‘abuse of discretion’ . . . [and] 12(b)(6) motions are reviewed de novo[,] . 
. . [a]pplying different standards of review, when the district court’s 
underlying action is the same, does not make sense.” Id.  
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(f) “does not authorize a district court to dismiss a claim for 
damages on the basis it is precluded as a matter of law.” Id. at 976. 
Yin Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether the terms “admission” [in 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(13)(A)] and “previously been admitted” [in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)] 
should be defined procedurally or substantively. Id. at 1096. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that defining the terms 
substantively render part of the waiver provision of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act superfluous. Id. at 1093, 1097. The court then reasoned 
that “if Congress intended [the statute] to bar only alien[s] lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence, there would be no need to describe 
those non-citizens as also previously . . . admitted to the United States.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also observed that, 
when possible, statutes “should not be construed to render their 
provisions mere surplusage” or to lead to absurd results. Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the plain meaning of 
“admission” and “previously been admitted” referred to “a procedurally 
regular admission and not a substantively lawful admission.” Id. at 1096. 
 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether to “adopt a per se rule of ineffectiveness” or 
“to apply the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel established in 
Strickland v. Washington [466 U.S. 668 (1984)]” in cases “where a 
defendant’s counsel has not been admitted to any bar . . . .” Id. at 1147. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that it had previously “rejected a 
per se ineffectiveness rule and applied the Strickland standard in a case 
where a criminal defendant was represented by an attorney whose bar 
membership was unknowingly revoked before his trial.” Id. The court 
distinguished the present case, however, as it involved “a criminal 
defendant . . . represented by a man claiming to have been successfully 
admitted to the bar, but who never attended law school or even graduated 
college.” Id. The court noted that the 2nd Circuit had “adopted a per se 
rule of ineffectiveness under similar facts” because the right to counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment “meant, at the very least, representation by a 
licensed practitioner.” Id. at 1147–48. The court agreed with the 
reasoning of the 2nd Circuit. Id. at 1148. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit therefore “adopt[ed] a narrow per 
se rule of ineffectiveness where a defendant is, unbeknownst to him, 
represented by someone who has not been admitted to any bar based on 
his failure to ever meet the substantive requirements for the practice of 
law.” Id. 
 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720 (11th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a search without reasonable suspicion of a 
crew member’s living quarters on a foreign cargo vessel that is entering 
this country is unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Id. at 
727. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) provides that 
any “officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any  
vessel . . . at any place in the United States and search the vessel . . . and 
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every part thereof.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, 
the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has recognized “the 
broad grant of authority that § 1581(a) confers on customs officers.” Id. 
at 726–27. To “determine the reasonableness of a border search,” the 
court weighed “its intrusion on [an] individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted that “the Fourth 
Amendment’s balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the 
international border than in the interior.” Id. at 728. The court further 
reasoned that “[b]ecause of the United States’ strong interest in national 
self-protection, [r]outine searches of the persons and effects of entrants 
are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable 
cause, or warrant.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court 
concluded that even though “[a] cabin is a crew member’s home—and a 
home receives the greatest Fourth Amendment protection,” a crew 
member’s cabin, just like a fixed home, “cannot be used as a means to 
transport into this country contraband or weapons of mass destruction 
that threaten national security.” Id. at 729–30. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held “that the suspicionless search 
of [a crew member’s] cabin on . . . a foreign cargo ship, while it was 
docked [at the United States border], was not a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.” Id. at 732. 
United States v. Cunningham, 607 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) is constitutional, thus 
allowing a district court to “revoke a term of supervised release, and 
require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of 
supervised release upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.” Id. at 1266 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS: The court first established that in proceedings 
associated with a revocation of parole, the defendant is not entitled to the 
same panoply of rights that an ordinary criminal prosecution would 
grant. Id. at 1267. The court then noted “that the Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial is not applicable during revocation proceedings because 
revocation at supervised release is treated as part of the penalty for the 
initial offense.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court next 
discussed whether the Fifth Amendment right to due process was 
violated, finding by the same token that the process due for revocation 
proceedings is not as sweeping as the due process protections in an 
original criminal action. Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that the 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(e)(3) is constitutional “because the violation of supervised release 
need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and there is no 
right to a trial by jury in a supervised release revocation hearing.” Id. at 
1268. 
Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether a private prison management corporation 
operating in a state prison is a public entity under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA). Id. at 1308. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the statute defines “public entity to 
mean any department, agency, special purpose district, or other 
instrumentality of a [s]tate.” Id. at 1309 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The court reasoned that all of these entities have one defining 
characteristic: they are “either traditional governmental units or created 
by [government].” Id. The court noted key differences between 
traditional governmental units and entities that merely contract for 
service with traditional governmental units. Id. at 1310. The court cited 
other judicial authority holding private entities that contract with 
traditional government units exempt from liability under the ADA. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that a private corporation is 
not subject to claims under the ADA as a result of contracting with 
governmental units that are liable under the ADA. Id. at 1310. 
United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “paying a minor directly for sex constitutes a 
‘purchase[] . . . of a minor,’ as that term is used in 18 U.S.C. § 
2251A(b)(2).” Id. at 1234. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that it “interpret[s] words that are 
not defined in a statute with their ordinary and plain meaning because [it] 
assume[s] that Congress uses words in a statute as they are commonly 
understood . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted 
“[t]he phrase ‘purchase a woman’ . . . can be used synonymously with 
prostitution.” Id. at 1235. The court further reasoned that “[i]n the 
context of child prostitution, the minor herself is turned into an object or 
commodity, by selling her body to be used by the defendant for a certain 
purpose.” Id. Moreover, the court reasoned that “control is inextricably 
intertwined within the meaning of purchase[,] and that “[i]t is the 
purchase itself, the paying of money to obtain or acquire the minor’s 
body, that is the means of control.” Id. at 1236. 
98 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 7:61 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held “that the term ‘purchase,’ as 
used in § 2251A(b), covers situations where a defendant pays a minor 
directly for sex.” Id. 
United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613 (11th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, as applied to a defendant smuggling 
aliens, the ‘bring and present’ requirement of 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) violates the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against 
self-incrimination.” Id. at 615. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Supreme Court has held that 
the Fifth Amendment privilege “may not be invoked to resist compliance 
with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State’s public purposes 
unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws.” Id. at 616. 
Additionally, the court reasoned that immigration law generally, as well 
as 8 U.S.C. § 1324 specifically, is properly classified as a regulatory 
scheme rather than a body of criminal law. Id. at 618. The court further 
observed that, significantly, the statute does not target illegal aliens; it 
imposes the “bring and present” requirement on all immigrants. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that the “bring and present” 
requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) did not violate the privilege 
against self-incrimination. Id. at 615. 
LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “a federal cause of action pursuant to § 1692e 
of the [Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)] for threatening to 
take an action that cannot legally be taken is cognizable when premised 
upon failure to register as a consumer collection agency as required by 
state law, namely, Section 559.553 of the FCCPA [(Florida Consumer 
Collections Protections Act)].” Id. at 1189–90. 
ANALYSIS: The court considered “the objectives of the FDPCA and 
the FCCPA, as well as the interplay between these state and federal 
statutes.” Id. at 1190. The court found that the purpose behind each of the 
acts was parallel, both seeking to curb abusive debt collection practices. 
Id. The court then noted that the relevant provisions of both Acts were 
consistent, and thus the FDCPA did not preempt the FCCPA. Id. 
Moreover, the court highlighted that the FCCPA’s explicit goal was “to 
provide the consumer with the most protection possible under either the 
state or federal statute[,]” supporting the permissibility of a federal 
remedy. Id. at 1192. Finally, the court observed that the “Florida 
legislature contemplated dual enforcement.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “a violation of the 
FCCPA for failure to register may, in fact, support a federal cause of 
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action under § 1692e(5) of the FDCPA for threatening to take an action it 
could not legally take[]” so long as the conduct also contravenes the 
analogous portion of the FDCPA. Id. 
United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the imposition of a sentence after a 
defendant violates the terms of his community control results in the 
application of [U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual] § 4A1.2(k) .” Id. at 
712. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “the comments to § 4A1.1 
state that § 4A1.2(k) applies to revocation of probation, parole, or a 
similar form of release” and “[s]imilarly, application note 11 explains 
that § 4A1.2(k) covers revocations of probation and other conditional 
sentences.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court reasoned 
that although “[t]his circuit has yet to interpret the term community 
control. . . . [t]he Sixth Circuit [found] that a community corrections 
sentence [was] sufficiently analogous to probation to warrant the 
application of § 4A1.2(k)(1).” Id. at 714 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The court noted that “[p]robation allows the government to 
oversee an offender’s rehabilitation while giving federal courts the 
authority to incarcerate the offender if he or she violates any of the stated 
conditions” and that “the primary purpose of probation is  
rehabilitation . . . .” Id. The court compared community control to 
probation, finding that both are “alternative, community-based methods 
to punish offenders in lieu of incarceration,” “[b]oth are discretionary 
forms of release subject to revocation,” and “[b]oth [programs] release 
the offender into the community subject to stated conditions and require 
extensive government supervision to ensure compliance.” Id. at 714–15. 
The court reasoned that “[b]oth contain conditions specifically designed 
to rehabilitate the offender and promote respect for the law while 
simultaneously protecting the public.” Id. at 715. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit concluded, “that community 
control is sufficiently analogous to probation to warrant the application 
of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k).” Id. 
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FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hen an attorney’s activities in prosecuting patents 
on behalf of a client raises [sic] an unacceptable risk of inadvertent 
disclosure.” Id. at 1379. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “[t]he concern over 
inadvertent disclosure manifests itself in patent infringement cases when 
trial counsel also represent the same client in prosecuting patent 
applications . . . .” Id. The court proceeded to find that “[s]ome attorneys 
[are] involved in patent litigation” but play “no significant role in 
crafting the content of patent applications or advising clients” while 
“many [other] attorneys involved in litigation are substantially engaged 
with prosecution.” Id. at 1379–80. The court reasoned that the former 
attorneys have a “remote” opportunity to “engage with the client in any 
competitive decisionmaking” and “a judge may find [these] attorney[s] 
[are] properly exempted from a prosecution bar”; however, for the latter 
attorneys, “competitive decisionmaking may be a regular part of their 
representation” and “such attorneys would not likely be properly 
exempted . . . .” Id. at 1380. The court concluded that for the “range of 
patent prosecution activities” in between these examples, a court must 
“examine all relevant facts surrounding counsel’s actual preparation and 
prosecution activities, on a counsel-by-counsel basis” when “assessing 
the propriety of an exemption from a patent prosecution bar.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held “that a party seeking 
imposition of a patent prosecution bar must show that the information 
designated to trigger the bar, the scope of activities prohibited by the bar, 
the duration of the bar, and the subject matter covered by the bar 
reasonably reflect the risk presented by the disclosure of proprietary 
competitive information.” Id. at 1381. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Alpine Elecs. of Am., Inc., 609 F.3d 
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether 35 U.S.C. § 120 “requires an intermediate 
[foreign patent] application in a priority chain to ‘contain a specific 
reference to the earlier filed application.’” Id. at 1349. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that § 120 had four requirements that a 
later-filed application must meet in order to be entitled to having “the 
same effect . . . as though filed on the date of the prior application.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy one of these requirements, 
the court noted “the application must be co-pending with the earlier 
application” or “an application can also claim the benefit of the filing 
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date of an earlier application through a chain of co-pending 
applications.” Id. at 1350. The court observed that applications are  
co-pending if “filed before the patenting or abandonment of or 
termination proceedings on . . . an application similarly entitled to the 
benefit of the filing date of the first application.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The court concluded that the plain language of § 120 
suggests that “similarly entitled” applications are “required to contain a 
specific reference to an earlier filed application.” Id. at 1350–51. 
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that every application in 
the chain of priority must refer to prior applications under 35 U.S.C.  
§ 120. Id. at 1352. 
 
